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Summary 
This Policy Brief argues that pursuing the 
renewables objective could contribute to the 
completion of the internal electricity market, 
help to overcome opposition to transmission 
projects and decrease the market power of 
incumbents. Conversely, an integrated internal 
electricity market means less price volatility in 
specific regional markets, which allows for more 
efficient deployment and grid integration of 
renewables.  
It is also shown that these benefits will not 
materialise automatically, however: citizens’ 
support for both policy goals may decrease as a 
result of rising retail prices; the current electricity 
market arrangements may not be able to deliver 
sufficient flexible capacity; and infrastructure 
deployment, which could benefit both objectives 
simultaneously, is currently hampered by a 
number of obstacles.  
Three sets of recommendations are proposed. 
First, European solutions will be needed to avoid 
suboptimal national policies, especially with a 
view to capacity mechanisms, ancillary services, 
renewable support schemes, and infrastructures. 
Second, the paper calls for increased efforts to 
improve locational signals for generation 
investments, in order to reduce the total costs of 
the electricity system. Finally, we emphasise the 
crucial contribution a well-designed electricity 
market can make to dealing with the uncertainty 
associated with the EU’s transition to a low-
carbon economy. 
Introduction 
Integrating electricity from renewable energy 
sources (RES-E) and achieving the single market 
for electricity are key components of the EU 2020 
strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive 
growth in the EU. However, in practice the two 
objectives are not aligned. 
Areas of conflict arising from the complex 
interplay between the renewables and the 
internal electricity market include issues such as 
renewable support schemes, uncoordinated 
national energy policy choices and an unequal 
burden-sharing between large- and small-scale 
customers. 
In fact, even though the official deadline for the 
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around the corner – in February 2011 the EU’s 
Heads of State and Government set the target to 
2014 – some market players conclude that 
Europe is further away from an integrated 
electricity market than ever.1 
This CEPS Policy Brief demonstrates that the two 
goals are not irreconcilable, however. Quite by 
contrast, the paper points to the great potential 
for synergies between the renewable and the 
internal electricity market goal. However, 
present and prospective conflicts are also 
analysed, explaining why the two objectives are 
not often on the same page in practice. The 
conclusion presents a set of policy 
recommendations on how a marriage could be 
arranged. 
Why they could make a great couple 
Investing in cross-border and internal grid 
infrastructure can contribute to achieving both 
the internal market goal and the cost-effective 
integration of RES-E in the power system. On the 
one hand, transmission infrastructure could 
benefit RES-E integration as destination markets 
for variable RES-E are enlarged. This can reduce 
storage requirements and backup capacity needs, 
thereby reducing the costs of integrating variable 
renewables into the electricity grid.  
At the same time, increasing transmission 
capacity could reduce congestion and allow for 
more electricity trading. This may lead to a 
substitution effect – more efficient generators 
replace less efficient ones – and/or a strategic 
effect, if market competitiveness increases as 
opportunities for market power abuse decrease 
(Migliavacca, 2011). In short, it can contribute to 
the very essence of what the internal energy 
market seeks to accomplish. 
Facilitating interconnectors 
In the past, many interconnector projects – which 
would have brought overall social welfare 
benefits – were not realised because they were in 
conflict with important national and company 
interests (Supponen, 2011). Put simply, if a high 
                                                      
1 Comment by Johannes Teyssen, CEO of E.ON and 
vice-President of Eurelectric at the Energy Roadmap 
2050 high-level stakeholder conference, organised on 
behalf of the European Commission, Brussels, 7 
February 2012. 
and a low price zone are interconnected, 
producers in the low-price zone gain as they can 
sell electricity in the high-price zone. Consumers 
in the high-price zone benefit from lower prices, 
while consumers in the low-price zone will face 
higher prices. On the other hand, producers in 
the low price zone gain as prices go up, whereas 
producers in the high-price zone would have to 
cope with lower prices. In short, producers in 
high-price zones as well as 
consumers/regulators in the low-price zone may 
oppose interconnection projects. 
But energy mixes in different countries may be 
complementary, leading to dynamic price 
differences. Traditionally, such 
complementarities can be observed for 
interconnectors linking thermal and hydro-based 
systems. The former type of system sees large 
price differences between day and night, but is 
not so volatile across seasons. Hydro-based 
systems, by contrast, have more stable prices 
during day and night but seasonal and annual 
prices hinge upon precipitation levels. In these 
cases, long-term net trade between two countries 
may well be balanced, while the value of the 
interconnector arises from gross trade. 
A paradigm example for such an effect is the 
NorNed cable, linking Norway and the 
Netherlands. Depending on precipitation levels, 
the main direction of the commercial flow 
changes. According to ENTSO-E’s electricity 
exchange statistics, the Netherlands was a net 
i m p o r t e r  f r o m  N o r w a y  i n  b o t h  2 0 0 8  ( 2 . 8   T W h )  
and 2009 (1.6 TWh). However, in 2010, a dry year 
in the Nordic countries, the Netherlands became 
a net exporter to Norway (1 TWh). To simplify: 
in dry years Norwegian consumers benefit, in 
wet years Dutch consumers do so. In a 
multiannual perspective, both countries’ 
consumers benefit, as they have lower average 
prices and less price fluctuation.  
Renewable deployment can help to mitigate the 
sometimes problematic distributional effects of 
interconnectors and lead to similarly 
complementary energy mixes. Due to the 
weather-induced variability of many RES-E, 
price differences should be more dynamic in the 
future. In other words, depending on the 
weather conditions, prices will be lower in one 
price zone or the other, leading to a shift from 
rather static to more dynamic price differences. 3 | JONAS TEUSCH 
 
Impetus for new power lines within member 
states 
In addition to facilitating cross-border projects, 
renewable deployment may also give impetus to 
transmission expansion within member states. 
The weak north-south link in Germany is one of 
the best-known examples. In order to bring wind 
production from the north to the centres of 
consumption in the south, internal grid 
reinforcements are necessary. In principle, these 
links could also be used, for example, to 
transport electricity from the Nordic countries to 
southern Germany and beyond when the wind is 
not blowing in northern Germany (Teusch et al., 
2012).  
Paint it green 
RES deployment can facilitate the deployment of 
infrastructures that benefit the internal market as 
well. In some member states, convincing locally 
affected populations of the need to build lines for 
the sake of integrating renewables may be easier 
than telling them that the infrastructure is 
needed to promote the internal market. This 
should particularly apply to countries where 
nuclear energy is regarded with scepticism.  
To give a concrete example, building a North 
Seas offshore grid intelligently would imply 
making sure that spare transmission capacity 
could be used for ‘ordinary’ power trading 
whenever the wind is not blowing 
(OffshoreGrid, 2011). As both the UK and 
Sweden have nuclear capacity, such a grid could 
also mean that countries which opted out of 
nuclear energy may import more nuclear power 
from other countries. In addition, the more 
transfer capacity is available, the more profitable 
nuclear capacity additions in the aforementioned 
countries may be. In other words, the ‘renewable 
rationale’ for building interconnectors may in 
some instances be able to brush over the lack of 
consensus on the energy mix across member 
states.  
Triggering greater coordination 
The Lisbon Treaty clearly states that the energy 
mix is the competence of the member states. At 
the same time, it should be clear that national 
energy mixes cannot be truly independent in an 
interconnected European market. Decisions 
taken in one country potentially have an impact 
o n  p r i c e s  a n d  s e c u r i t y  o f  s u p p l y  i n  o t h e r s ,  a s  
became evident in the aftermath of Fukushima. 
In reaction to the lack of coordination post-
Fukushima an electricity coordination group was 
set up, which held its inaugural meeting in 
December 2011. It comprises member state 
representatives and other relevant stakeholders, 
such as TSOs and industry associations.  
Renewable deployment may be helpful in terms 
of triggering greater coordination as the 
characteristics of variable renewables illustrate 
the benefits of coordination: wind, solar or other 
variable renewable power plants are more 
efficient in some locations than others; larger 
markets reduce storage requirements and 
backup capacity needs; and the costs of RES-E 
integration can be further reduced by 
harmonised balancing markets (as discussed 
below). 
Competition 
As renewable support schemes have 
transformed many former consumers into 
entrepreneurs, they are also leading to a more 
diversified energy supply structure, thereby 
decreasing the market concentration of 
incumbents in some measure.  
Demand response 
In addition, the fact that increased attention is 
now being paid to improving demand response 
by electricity consumers, in order to better 
accommodate variable renewables, could 
contribute to the functioning of the internal 
electricity market as greater price elasticity can 
be an effective means of preventing market 
power abuse and decreasing the need for 
expensive peaking capacity.  
Regulatory synergies 
The development of European network codes is 
another example of how the internal market and 
the renewable objective can be achieved at the 
same time. Network codes are relevant for both 
cross-border trade and the cost-effective 
integration of offshore wind farms into the 
European electricity network.  
Last but not least, other important aspects of 
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trading possibilities and short gate closure times 
are also crucial to ensure the cost-effective 
integration of variable RES-E into the electricity 
grid. 
Present and prospective conflicts 
A major promise of the internal energy market is 
to deliver affordable energy to consumers. Yet, 
as outlined in the Commission’s (2011b) Energy 
Roadmap 2050, electricity prices will most likely 
rise until 2030. While there are many reasons for 
this – Europe is also on the verge of a new 
investment cycle as a large amount of 
infrastructure is outdated and has to be replaced 
in the next few years – citizens may (and some 
have already started to) blame market 
liberalisation and renewable deployment for 
their rising electricity bills. 
Unequal burden-sharing 
Citizens’ support for the EU’s transition to a 
competitive low-carbon economy may also 
decrease as a result of various government 
actions aimed at preserving industrial 
competitiveness at home. Being concerned about 
their industries’ ability to compete in global 
markets, governments are inclined to protect 
their industry from rising electricity prices by 
cross-subsidising large and medium-scale 
industry at the expense of small-scale customers. 
This can take the form of discounted grid 
charges or limiting the extent to which large- and 
medium-scale customers have to share the costs 
of feed-in tariffs. Ordinary customers without 
political clout are left to bear the costs alone. 
Germany is a particularly striking case in point. 
Breeding ground for protectionism 
In addition, such government interventions may 
lead to some unhealthy intra-European 
competition as to who is best at shielding its own 
industry from rising electricity prices. Since 
European enterprises often face stiff competition 
from other companies within Europe, effective 
cross-subsidisation may bring significant 
competitive advantages for domestic industry. 
The consequences are potentially severe as new 
market distortions are created outside the 
wholesale electricity market, where European 
oversight in difficult. 
At present, the internal electricity market is 
still/already suffering from a wide variety of 
market distortions related to limited transport 
capacity, non-harmonised market rules, weak 
regulators, and high degrees of market 
concentration. As of 27 February 2012, seven 
member states have not yet communicated any 
transposition measures with regard to the 
Electricity Directive of the Third Energy Package 
– which should have been implemented by 3 
March 2011. Other member states have only 
partially transposed the Directive. 
The flexibility challenge 
Notably, the expansion of variable RES-E has an 
impact on thermal-based power generation that 
requires more starts and stops. As a result, 
“the large amount of thermal capacity that 
essentially operates as a backup ... becomes 
more valuable for its capacity than its energy 
output” (Pöyry, 2011). 
In other words, due to the preference given to 
renewables, fossil fuel-based thermal capacity 
can be expected to have a relatively low load 
factor.  
The problem is that, while scenario analyses 
suggest that in the long term even a 100% RES-E 
scenario is possible (e.g. ECF, 2010), conventional 
capacity will still be needed for a transitional 
period to ensure that supply meets demand at all 
times – even on the notorious cloudy, windless 
winter days.  
In theory, energy-only markets (where 
investments are solely driven by electricity 
prices) would be able to deal with low load 
factors for conventional generation capacity and 
highly volatile revenue streams – as long as no 
price caps exist – since the costs for backup 
plants could be recovered through very high 
scarcity prices at times when RES-E are not able 
to meet demand. Yet, an interaction of various 
market rules may lead to implicit price caps, 
even when prices are no longer explicitly 
regulated.2 In addition, the uncertainty that 
comes along with transitions aggravates the 
situation, as investors are not sure how long 
                                                      
2 For an explanation of this complex phenomenon, see 
Hogan (2008). 5 | JONAS TEUSCH 
 
their conventional power plants will still be 
needed. 
Capacity mechanisms 
The fact that several member states are 
discussing the introduction of capacity 
mechanisms (e.g. the UK Department of Energy 
& Climate Change, 2011) shows that there are 
serious doubts about whether sufficient 
conventional generation capacity investment will 
take place. When a capacity mechanism is in 
place, power plants are remunerated for being 
available for system balancing or peak demand. 
However, capacity mechanisms may lead to 
more market distortions and further delay the 
completion of the internal electricity market 
(Zachmann, 2011). Potential risks related to the 
introduction of poorly designed capacity 
mechanisms include increasing the market 
power of incumbents and causing unfair cross-
payments between customers and/or generators 
of different member states.3  
While capacity mechanisms are meant to reduce 
uncertainty, the uncertainty arising from 
discussing capacity mechanisms and other 
market interventions (radical proposals go as far 
as a suggestion to replace the energy-only 
market with a central purchaser model), may 
actually induce potential investors to further 
delay investment decisions.  This could result in 
a self-fulfilling prophecy. 
Storage 
Storage facilities can help to deal with the fact 
that many renewables are variable. Yet, most 
forms of storage are still very expensive and not 
commercially viable. The commercial viability of 
storage crucially depends on both temporal price 
differences and the cost of storage. The more 
dynamic price differences that come along the 
deployment of variable renewables increases the 
profitability of storage. Needless to say, price 
caps of any kind will decrease the commercial 
                                                      
3 For example, if member state A has a capacity 
mechanism that is paid for by domestic consumers 
(e.g. through higher network tariffs) and that 
guarantees a high level of supply security, member 
state B – if interconnected with A – may also benefit 
from this capacity mechanism in the internal 
electricity market. 
viability of storage. Allowing for proper scarcity 
pricing is thus not only important to incentivise 
the market to provide for sufficient flexible 
capacity, but also to attract market-based 
investments in storage. 
New flow patterns 
Dealing with new variable flow patterns is 
complex and may cause loop flows. This 
represents both a technical and a regulatory 
challenge. Technical solutions comprise 
optimising transmission switching and making 
use of phase shifters. In addition, until better 
forecasting tools are available, variable RES-E 
imply greater uncertainty regarding the exact 
location and timing of power generation. As a 
result, TSOs may decide to use a higher security 
margin to ensure secure network operation.  
Integrating balancing markets 
Another regulatory challenge lies in the 
integration of electricity balancing markets, as 
the traditional approach – i.e. performing 
balancing at the control-area level without 
sharing balancing resources – is not ideal in 
terms of either variable RES-E integration or the 
efficient use of available generation capacities. 
Nevertheless, given the highly complex nature of 
the subject (the practices of TSOs differ widely 
across Europe) this process will take time. The 
Agency for the Cooperation of Energy 
Regulators (ACER) is currently drafting 
framework guidelines for an EU code on 
balancing (expected in the third quarter of 2012). 
Such a code should result in harmonised and 
integrated balancing markets throughout the EU.  
In fact, this is a crucial prerequisite for fully 
reaping the benefits of increased transmission 
capacity. Still, while cross-border balancing can 
in principle benefit both objectives, it potentially 
involves a trade-off with commercial exchanges 
of electricity. This is supported by the ongoing 
debate, mainly taking place between TSOs and 
regulators, on whether and under what 
conditions transmission capacity should be 
reserved to allow for cross-border exchanges of 
power reserves.  
How to arrange the marriage 
The analysis presented so far has shown that 
pursuing the renewable objective can RENEWABLES AND THE EU INTERNAL ELECTRICITY MARKET | 6 
 
complement the internal market as it may trigger 
more coordination among member states, and, 
more generally, create a constituency for reform. 
At the same time, an integrated European 
electricity system allows for a more efficient 
integration of renewable energy.  
But several threats are looming on the horizon 
before the benefits of these synergies can be 
reaped: citizens’ support for both policy goals is 
jeopardised by rising retail prices and unequal 
burden-sharing across different consumer 
groups; renewable policies as well as security of 
supply-oriented policies (e.g. capacity 
mechanisms) may be ‘hijacked’ by governments 
to pursue protectionist policies; and a number of 
obstacles are preventing the infrastructure roll-
out from taking place in time.  
Recommendation I: Avoid isolated national 
responses to challenges arising from the 
transition to a competitive low-carbon 
economy. 
Policy-makers should opt for a coordinated 
European approach to avoid suboptimal and 
potentially market-distorting national 
measures with a view to (a) capacity 
mechanisms, (b) ancillary services, (c) 
renewables support, and (d) infrastructures. 
a) The fact that some member states fear 
electricity shortages in the future should be 
taken seriously. But there are at least three more 
ways to deal with the challenge of integrating 
large amounts of variable generation into the 
grid than introducing capacity mechanisms: grid 
expansion (both within and between member 
states), demand response, and storage. In 
addition, variability represents only one part of 
the challenge; the bigger underlying issue is the 
increased uncertainty for investors due to the 
many unknown implications of the energy 
transition (see also: Recommendation III). 
Member states should be encouraged to at least 
consider other flexibility options before 
introducing capacity mechanisms. Grid 
expansion is a particularly promising measure 
that could make a significant contribution to 
both the internal market objective as well as the 
integration of RES-E. In the case where member 
state governments are determined to push the 
issue of capacity mechanisms further, the EU 
should be involved by encouraging best practice 
exchange (some member states already have 
capacity mechanisms in place) and by 
developing framework guidelines. Designing an 
intelligent capacity mechanism that sends the 
right qualitative and locational signals is 
challenging. Existing designs of capacity 
mechanisms favour fossil-fuelled powered 
plants over low carbon sources, and would 
therefore need to be adapted (Hood, 2011).  
b) When the costs of balancing and other 
ancillary services increase with a rising share of 
variable generation, wholesale electricity prices 
become, relatively speaking, less important for 
retail price formation (Zachmann, 2011). As 
ancillary services are often not organised in a 
transparent, market-based way, it may lead to 
distortions of the internal electricity market. 
The provision of ancillary services requires 
European-level attention and will hopefully be 
tackled by the forthcoming Commission 
communication with proposals on refinements to 
ensure the completion of the internal energy 
market. As a guiding principle, market 
mechanisms should be at the heart of as many 
parts of the electricity value chain as possible 
(see also: Recommendation III).  
c) In this regard, it is important to point to the 
need for a European approach to integrating 
RES-E. According to the national renewable 
energy action plans, electricity will already 
represent 35% of electricity generated in 2020. It 
should be self-evident that one cannot design an 
efficient market around renewables. Renewables 
have to become part of the market themselves 
(see also: Recommendation III).  
But making renewables part of the market 
requires, first of all, that there is a functioning 
electricity market that renewables can become a 
part of. It is noteworthy that in a well-
functioning electricity market, there would no 
longer be a need to grant priority access to 
variable renewables. As variable renewables 
such as wind, solar, or geothermal energy have 
zero fuel costs, they are highly competitive in the 
merit order. This is because power plants are 
ranked according to their short-run marginal 
costs of production. Put differently, the fact that 
the levelised costs of electricity (a measure 
illustrating the overall competiveness of different 7 | JONAS TEUSCH 
 
generation technologies) is still higher for most 
RES-E (IEA 2010), does not matter for their 
position in the merit order. 
This last point also implies that integrating 
renewables into the market does not mean that 
subsidies for renewables should be removed for 
all technologies. It would rather be important to 
create a level playing field across Europe, 
making sure that renewables are developed 
where they are most efficient – both in terms of 
natural conditions as well as from an electricity 
system integration perspective (see also 
Recommendations II and III). 
However, a fully harmonised European support 
scheme for renewables seems highly unlikely for 
political reasons. Notably, one important 
argument of RES supporters is that renewables 
deployment promotes technological innovation 
and employment at home. And as the euro crisis 
demonstrates, member state governments and 
citizens alike do not necessarily think European. 
The fact that member states’ forecast documents 
show that cooperation mechanisms, as 
established by the 2009 Renewables Directive, 
are expected to make only a marginal 
contribution to achieving the renewable targets 
may serve as anecdotal evidence for such 
national perspectives.  
d) Isolated national perspectives are also at the 
heart of the cross-border infrastructure dilemma. 
While a transmission infrastructure that is 
optimised from a European perspective would 
increase overall welfare, doing so in practice is 
difficult as national regulators are still legally 
obliged to honour national objectives such as 
ensuring national security of supply and keeping 
national network tariffs as low as possible. 
The Energy Infrastructure Regulation proposed 
by the European Commission (2011a) is a 
pragmatic answer to these challenges. While it 
would benefit from some fine-tuning (Teusch et 
al., 2012), it is important that the common 
European approach to the infrastructure 
challenge is not watered down in the 
negotiations between Parliament and Council. 
Cost-benefit analyses dominated by national 
preferences cannot deliver the infrastructures 
needed to make Europe’s transition to a 
competitive low-carbon economy a success. The 
lengthy authorisation process has to be 
streamlined as well. 
Recommendation II: Improve locational 
signals for generation investments. 
In order to increase the efficiency of Europe’s 
power sector, efforts should be made to 
improve locational signals for generation 
investments. 
The effective unbundling requirements of the 
third energy market liberalisation package imply 
that in many member states connection costs are 
no longer relevant for power generators. But 
locational signals need to be provided to avoid 
excessive connection costs and reduce total 
systems costs. Electricity is not like any other 
commodity; it actually matters where power is 
produced. Providing effective locational signals 
without intervening in the market is challenging.  
One interesting option to attract generation 
investment in places where it is needed and/or 
to create a constituency for grid expansion is to 
redesign price zones  
“so that the congested parts of the network 
are at their outer borders and that inside the 
zones transmission from any generator to 
any load can be guaranteed with reasonable 
certainty” (Supponen, 2011).  
Still, the issue of price zone redesign, which 
would in some cases imply smaller price zones 
as well as price zones crossing national 
boundaries, is not clear-cut. A recent study 
commissioned by the German regulatory 
authority (Frontier Economics and Consentec, 
2011) points to possible negative consequences 
associated with smaller price zones, as they 
might, for example, lead to reduced market 
liquidity, the increased market power of large 
electricity generators and reduced retail 
competition. A careful assessment on a case by 
case basis is therefore needed.  
In the case of variable RES-E in particular, there 
is often a trade-off between the location and the 
efficiency of the power plant. From an overall 
welfare point of view, it may for example make 
sense to build a solar or wind power plant 
somewhere rather less sunny or windy than 
another location, if this ‘less efficient location’ is 
easier to connect to centres of consumption. 
Smart renewable support schemes would RENEWABLES AND THE EU INTERNAL ELECTRICITY MARKET | 8 
 
provide these kinds of locational signals (e.g 
prefer premiums over fixed feed-in tariffs) and, 
at least to a certain extent, internalise connection 
and other electricity system costs.  
Recommendation III: Minimise the political 
uncertainty associated with the transition 
of the power sector. 
The uncertainty arising from the many 
challenges of the ongoing decarbonisation of 
the power sector makes it difficult to attract 
private sector investment. Sustainable market-
based policies targeting the electricity sector 
are therefore all the more important to keep 
political uncertainty at bay. 
First of all, it is important to stress that one 
should not try to do away with the normal 
uncertainty associated with unknown future 
developments. In fact, there is little one can do 
about this kind of uncertainty: we will always be 
surprised by technological developments; and 
history tells us that any attempt to predict the 
future is doomed to fail. Here, the best one can 
do is to preserve flexibility to be able to respond 
dynamically to future events. 
The Commission’s (2011b) Energy Roadmap 
2050 deserves credit for making a case for 
accepting this kind of uncertainty. The Roadmap 
is technology-neutral and demonstrates that 
there are at least five feasible decarbonisation 
pathways. Importantly, it does not indicate a 
preference for any of them. Instead, it identifies 
the development of a new, flexible infrastructure 
as a no-regret option.  
But how well does existing RES-E and internal 
electricity market legislation fare in terms of 
minimising political uncertainty that determines 
investors’ willingness to invest? Here, political 
uncertainty is defined as the likelihood that 
policy-makers will opt for fundamentally 
different policies in the future. It is this kind of 
uncertainty that investors fear most when 
assessing the risk of stranded investments, as it 
includes policy options such as nationalisation 
and the replacement of an economic model (e.g. 
a single purchaser model instead of the energy- 
only market model).  
Such radical political choices are more likely to 
b e  p u r s u e d  w h e n  t h e  s t a t u s  q u o  i s  i n  s e v e r e  
disequilibrium. By agreeing on sustainable 
policies (broadly understood), policy-makers can 
minimise this kind of uncertainty. Put 
differently, if existing policies are economically 
sound and do not have troublesome 
distributional effects, there will be few incentives 
to overthrow these policies in the future. 
Applied to this paper’s topic, the distributional 
effects resulting from member states’ responses 
to the rising costs of electricity are challenging. A 
closer look at the Roadmap underlines this. At 
first glance, it seems reassuring that the 
Roadmap acknowledges that there may be a 
need for “safeguards against carbon leakage” to 
preserve industry competiveness and that “the 
social aspects of energy pricing should be 
reflected in the energy policy of Member States”.  
Yet, one should not forget that this implies that 
sectors believed to be unaffected by carbon 
leakage, as well as ordinary customers, will have 
to shoulder an even greater share of the costs 
associated with the energy transition. 
The fact that more and more exemptions and 
redistributional policies may be needed in the 
future represents a serious caveat with a view to 
decreasing political uncertainty. In other words, 
investors may conclude that the market will only 
play a minor (if any) role in the energy 
transition.  
As this Policy Brief has argued, at least with 
regard to the internal electricity market and the 
renewable objective, there is great potential for 
synergies. In order to exploit this potential, a 
strong commitment to the market is essential, as 
the market is best at dealing with the normal 
uncertainty associated with future 
developments. To serve as an example and 
reassure market participants, the marriage 
between renewable and internal electricity 
market policy goals should henceforth be 
arranged.  9 | JONAS TEUSCH 
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